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Abstract: The widespread use of smartphones gives rise to new security and privacy concerns. Smartphone thefts account
for the largest percentage of thefts in recent crime statistics. Using a victim’s smartphone, the attacker can
launch impersonation attacks, which threaten the security of the victim and other users in the network. Our
threat model includes the attacker taking over the phone after the user has logged on with his password or
pin. Our goal is to design a mechanism for smartphones to better authenticate the current user, continuously
and implicitly, and raise alerts when necessary. In this paper, we propose a multi-sensors-based system to
achieve continuous and implicit authentication for smartphone users. The system continuously learns the
owner’s behavior patterns and environment characteristics, and then authenticates the current user without
interrupting user-smartphone interactions. Our method can adaptively update a user’s model considering the
temporal change of user’s patterns. Experimental results show that our method is efficient, requiring less than
10 seconds to train the model and 20 seconds to detect the abnormal user, while achieving high accuracy (more
than 90%). Also the combination of more sensors provide better accuracy. Furthermore, our method enables
adjusting the security level by changing the sampling rate.
1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, we have witnessed an increasing de-
velopment of mobile devices such as smartphones and
tablets. Smartphones are also becoming an impor-
tant means for accessing various online services, such
as online social networks, email and cloud comput-
ing. Many applications and websites allow users to
store their information, passwords, etc. Users also
save various contact information, photos, schedules
and other personal information in their smartphones.
No one wants personal and sensitive information to
be leaked to others without their permission. How-
ever, the smartphone is easily stolen, and the attacker
can have access to the personal information stored in
the smartphone. Furthermore, the attacker can steal
the victim’s identity and launch impersonation attacks
in networks, which would threaten the victim’s per-
sonal and sensitive information like his bank account,
as well as the security of the networks, especially on-
line social networks. Therefore, providing reliable
access control of the information stored on smart-
phones, or accessible through smartphones, is very
important. But, first, it is essential to be able to au-
thenticate the legitimate user of the smartphone, and
distinguish him or her from other unauthorized users.
Passwords are currently the most common way
for authentication. However, they suffer from sev-
eral weaknesses. Passwords are vulnerable to attacks
because they are easily guessed. They suffer from so-
cial engineering attacks, like phishing, pretexting, etc.
The usability issue is also a serious factor, since users
do not like to have to enter, and reenter, passwords or
pins. A study (ConsumerReports, 2013) shows that
64% of users do not use passwords as an authentica-
tion mechanism on their smartphones. Hence, this pa-
per proposes a means of implicit and continuous au-
thentication, beyond the initial authentication by pass-
word, pin or biometric (e.g., fingerprint).
Implicit authentication does not rely on the di-
rect involvement of the user, but is closely related to
his/her biometric behavior, habits or living environ-
ment. We propose a form of implicit authentication
realized by building the user’s profile based on mea-
surements from various sensors in a typical smart-
phone. Specifically, the sensors within the smart-
phones can reflect users’ behavior patterns and envi-
ronment characteristics. The recent development and
integration of sensor technologies in smartphones,
and advances in modeling user behavior create new
Table 1: Sensors enabled in some popular smartphones.
Sensor Nexus 5 iphone 5s Galaxy S5
accelerometer Yes Yes Yes
gyroscope Yes Yes Yes
magnetic field Yes Yes Yes
light Yes Yes Yes
proximity Yes Yes Yes
pressure Yes No Yes
temperature No No No
orientation Yes No No
GPS Yes Yes Yes
MIC Yes Yes Yes
camera Yes Yes Yes
Network Yes Yes Yes
opportunities for better smartphone security.
In this paper, we propose a multi-sensor-based
system to achieve continuous and implicit authentica-
tion for smartphone users. The system leverages data
collected by three sensors: accelerometer, orientation
sensor, and magnetometer, in a smartphone, and then
trains a user’s profile using the SVM machine learn-
ing technique. The system continuously authenticates
the current user without interrupting user-smartphone
interactions. The smartphone’s security system is
alerted once abnormal usage is detected by our im-
plicit authenticationmechanism, so that access to sen-
sitive information can be shut down or restricted ap-
propriately, and further checking and remediation ac-
tions can be taken. Our authenticationmechanism can
adaptively update a user’s profile every day consider-
ing that the user’s pattern may change slightly with
time. Our experimental results on two different data
sets show the effectiveness of our proposed idea. It
only takes less than 10 seconds to train the model ev-
eryday and 20 seconds to detect abnormal usage of
the smartphone, while achieving high accuracy (90%,
up to 95%).
We arrived at our three-sensor solution by first
testing the performance on a single-sensor-based sys-
tem, considering each of the accelerometer, the orien-
tation sensor and the magnetometer. We found that
the authentication accuracy for measurements from
the orientation sensor alone is worse than that of
the accelerometer alone or the magnetometer alone.
Then, we test a two-sensors-based system, using pair-
wise combinations from these three sensors. This
showed that the combination of multiple sensors can
improve the accuracy of the resulting authentication.
We then combined the measurements from all three
sensors, and showed that while there was a slight
performance improvement, this incremental improve-
ment is much less than going from one to two sensors,
and the authentication accuracy is already above 90%,
reaching 95%. We also show that our method allows
the users to adjust their security levels by changing
the sampling rate of the collected data.
The main contributions of our paper are summa-
rized below.
• We propose a multi-sensor-based system to
achieve continuous and implicit authentication,
which is accurate, efficient and flexible.
• We compare our three-sensor-based method with
single-sensor and two-sensors-based methods on
two real data sets. Our three-sensor-based method
is shown to have the best performance.
• We also analyze the balance between the authen-
tication accuracy and the training time. We give a
reasonable trade-off with respect to the sampling
rate and the data size, that is practical and mean-
ingful in the real world environment of commod-
ity smartphone users.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Smartphone inputs and sensors
A unique feature of a smartphone is that it is equipped
with a lot of sensors. Table 1 lists some common sen-
sors in some of the most popular smartphones. Ta-
ble 2 lists the sensors’ functionality, description of the
measurements made, what it can be used for in terms
of user or smartphone authentication, and whether
Android permissions are required to read the sensor’s
measurements.
Smartphone sensor information include measure-
ments from an accelerometer, gyroscope, magne-
tometer, orientation sensor, ambient light, proximity
sensor, barometric pressure and temperature. Other
more privacy sensitive inputs include a user’s loca-
tion as measured by his GPS location, WLAN, cell
tower ID and Bluetooth connections. Also privacy
sensitive are audio and video inputs like the micro-
phone and camera. The contacts, running apps, apps’
network communication pattern, browsing history,
screen on/off state, battery status and so on, can also
help to characterize a user.
2.2 Related work
Table 3 summarizes and compares our work with past
work on sensor-based authentication.
With the increasing development of mobile
sensing technology, collecting many measurements
through sensors in smartphones is now becoming not
only possible, but quite easy through, for example,
Table 2: Sensor measurements, common usage and whether applications need the user’s permission to access measurements.
Sensor Description Common Use Permission
accelerometer
Measures the acceleration force in m/s2
on all three physical axes (x, y, and z)
Motion detection No
orientation
Measures degrees of rotation in rad
on all three physical axes (x, y, z)
Rotation detection. No
magnetometer
Measures the ambient geomagnetic field
for all three physical axes (x, y, z) in µT
Environment detection
(compass)
No
gyroscope
Measures a device’s rate of rotation in rad/s
on all three physical axes (x, y, and z)
Rotation detection No
light Measures the ambient light level in lx Environment detection No
proximity
Measures the proximity of an object in cm
relative to the view screen of a device
Phone position during a call. No
pressure Measures the ambient air pressure in hPa Environment detection No
temperature
Measures the ambient room temperature
in degrees Celsius
Environment detection No
GPS Positioning Tracking and Positioning Yes
microphone Record voice Speech recognition Yes
camera Record image Face recognition Yes
network Provide user connection to internet
Connectivity, location,
surfing patterns
Yes
Android sensor APIs. Mobile sensing applications,
such as the CMU MobiSens (Wu et al., 2013), run as
a service in the background and can constantly collect
sensors’ information from smartphones. Sensors can
be either hard sensors (e.g., accelerometers) that are
physically-sensing devices or soft sensors that record
information of a phone’s running status (e.g., screen
on/off).
Continuous authentication on smartphones is
likely to become an interesting new research area,
given the easily accessible data today in smartphones.
In (Kayacık et al., 2014), a lightweight, and tem-
porally & spatially aware user behavior model is pro-
posed for authentication based on both hard and soft
sensors. They considered four different attacks and
showed that even the informed insider can be detected
in 717 seconds. However, they did not quantitatively
show the accuracy. In comparison, our method not
only clearly shows high accuracy performance but
also requires much less detection time (e.g., we only
need 20 seconds to detect an abnormal user while
training the profiles for less than 10 seconds.)
SenSec (Zhu et al., 2013) constantly collects data
from the accelerometer, gyroscope and magnetome-
ter, to construct the gesture model while the user is
using the device. SenSec is shown to achieve an ac-
curacy of 75% in identifying users and 71.3% in de-
tecting the non-owners. However, they ask users to
follow a script, i.e., a specific series of actions, for
authentication. In comparison, we do not need users
to follow a specific script while still getting good au-
thentication accuracy, higher than 90%.
In (Buthpitiya et al., 2011), an n-gram geo-based
model is proposed for modeling a user’s mobility pat-
tern. They use the GPS sensor to demonstrate that
the system could detect abnormal activities (e.g., a
phone being stolen) by analyzing a user’s location his-
tory, and the accuracy they achieve is 86.6%. How-
ever, they just utilize a single sensor for authentica-
tion, which largely limits their performance. By ex-
ploiting multiple sensors, our method achieves better
accuracy.
Biometric-based systems have also been used
to achieve continuous and unobservable authenti-
cation for smartphones (Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013)
(Li et al., 2013) (Nickel et al., 2012). However, they
ask users to follow a script for authentication. In com-
parison, we do not need users to follow a specific
script while still getting good authentication accu-
racy. (Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013) developed a mix-
ture of a keystroke-based and a handwriting-based
method to realize authentication through the screen
sensor. Their approach has 11% false acceptance
rate and 16% false rejection rate. (Li et al., 2013)
proposed another biometric method to do authenti-
cation for smartphones. They exploited five basic
movements (sliding up, down, right, left and tapping)
and the related combinations as the user’s features,
to perform authentication. An accelerometer-based
biometric gait recognition to authenticate smart-
phones through k-NN algorithm was proposed in
(Nickel et al., 2012). Their work is based on the as-
Table 3: Comparison of our method (we just apply one of our results in PU data set.) and state-of-art research in implicit
authentication (if the information is given in the paper cited, otherwise it is shown as n.a. (not available)). FP is false positive
rate and FN is false negative rate. train means the time for training the model and test means the time for detecting the
abnormal usage. The script column shows whether a user has to follow a script. If a script is required, we can not achieve
implicit authentication without user participation.
Devices Sensors Method Accuracy
Detecting
time
Script
Our method
Nexus 5
Android
orientation,
magnetometer,
accelerometer
SVM 90.23%
train:6.07s
test:20s
No
Kayacik et al., 2014 Android
light,
orientation,
magnetometer,
accelerometer
temporal &
spatial model
n.a.
train: n.a.
test:≥122s
No
Zhu et al., 2013 Nexus S
orientation,
magnetometer,
accelerometer
n-gram
language
model
71.3% n.a. Yes
Buthpitiya et al.,2011 n.a. GPS
n-gram model
on location
86.6%
train:n.a.
test:≥30min
No
Trojahn et al., 2013
HTC
Desire
screen
keystroke &
handwriting
FP:11%
FN:16%
n.a. Yes
Li et al., 2013
Motorola
Droid
screen sliding pattern 95.7%
train: n.a.
test:0.648s
Yes
Nickel et al., 2012
Motorola
Milestone
accelerometer K-NN
FP:3.97%
FN:22.22%
train:1.5min
test:30s
Yes
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Figure 1: In our method, we first construct a vector at each time by using sensors’ data (In experiment, we use 9 values from
the accelerometer, magnetometer and orientation sensor in a smartphone.) After that, we re-sample the data collected from
the sensors in a smartphone. Then, we train the re-sampled data with the SVM technique to get a user’s profile. Based on the
user’s profile, we can do the implicit authentication.
sumption that different people have different walk-
ing patterns. Their process only takes 30 seconds.
However, their approach asks the users to follow a
script, where they just record the data when the user
is walking. In comparison, we do not need the user to
follow any script, which means that we can provide
continuous protection without user interaction, while
their approach can only guarantee security for walk-
ing users.
The fact that sensors reflect an individual’s be-
havior and environment can not only be used for
authentication, but can also lead to new attacks.
(Xu et al., 2012) proposed an attack to infer a user’s
input on a telephone key pad from measurements of
the orientation sensor. They used the accelerometer
to detect when the user is using a smartphone, and
predicted the PIN through the use of gyroscope mea-
surements.
Sensors also reflect environmental informa-
tion, which can be used to reveal some sensitive
information. By using measurements from an ac-
celerometer on a smartphone to record the vibrations
from a nearby keyboard (Marquardt et al., 2011),
the authors could decode the context. In
(Michalevsky et al., 2014), the authors show that
the gyroscope can record the vibration of acoustic
signals, and such information can be used to derive
the credit card number.
3 KEY IDEAS
Some past work only consider
one sensor to do authentication
(Buthpitiya et al., 2011)(Trojahn and Ortmeier, 2013)(Li et al., 2013)(Nickel et al., 2012).
We will show that the authentication accuracy can be
improved by taking other sensors into consideration.
We propose a multi-sensor-based technology with a
machine learning method for implicit authentication,
which only takes a short time to detect the abnormal
user, but also needs less than 10 seconds to retrain
the user’s profile every day. First, we collect the
data from the selected sensors. Then, we use the
SVM technique as the classification algorithm to
differentiate the usage patterns of various users and
authenticate the user of the smartphone.
Our methodology can be extended to other sen-
sors in a straight-forward manner. Figure 1 shows our
methodology, and the key ideas are presented below.
3.1 Sensor Selection
There are a lot of sensors built into smartphones
nowadays as shown in Table 1 and Table 2. With
smartphones becoming more connected with our
daily lives, a lot of personal information can be stored
in the sensors. The goal is to choose a small set of
sensors that can accurately represent a user’s char-
acteristics. In this paper, we experiment with three
sensors that are commonly found in smartphones: ac-
celerometers, orientation sensors and magnetometers.
They also represent different information about the
user’s behavior and environment: the accelerometer
can detect coarse-grainedmotion of a user like how he
walks (Nickel et al., 2012), the orientation sensor can
detect fine-grained motion of a user like how he holds
a smartphone (Xu et al., 2012), and the magnetometer
measurements can perhaps be useful in representing
his environment. Furthermore, these sensors do not
need the user’s permission to be used in Android ap-
plications, which is useful for continuous monitoring
for implicit authentication.
Also, these three sensors do not need the user to
perform a sequence of actions dictated by a script–
hence facilitating implicit authentication. Note that
our method is not limited to these three sensors, but
can be easily generalized to different selections of
hard or soft sensors, or to incorporate more sensors.
3.2 Data Sets and Re-sampling
We use two data sets, a new one which we collected
locally by ourselves which we call the PU data set,
and another data set which we obtained from the
authors of a published paper (Kayacık et al., 2014),
which we call the GCU data set.
The PU data set is collected from 4 graduate stu-
dents in Princeton University in 2014 based on the
smartphone, Google Nexus 5 with Android 4.4. It
contains sensor data from the accelerometer, orien-
tation sensor and magnetometer with a sampling rate
of 5 Hz. The duration of the data collected is approx-
imately 5 days for each user. Each sensor measure-
ment consists of three values, so we construct a vec-
tor from these nine values. We use different sampling
rates as a factor in our experiments, to construct data
points.
We use the second data set, called the GCU dataset
version 2 (Kayacık et al., 2014), for comparison. This
is collected from 4 users consisting of staff and stu-
dents of Glasgow Caledonian University. The data
was collected in 2014 from Android devices and con-
tains sensor data from wifi networks, cell towers, ap-
plication use, light and sound levels, acceleration, ro-
tation, magnetic field and device system statistics.
The duration of the data collected is approximately
3 weeks. For better comparison with our PU data set,
we only use the data collected from the accelerometer,
orientation sensor and magnetometer data.
The sensor measurements originally obtained are
too large to process directly. Hence, we use a re-
sampling process to not only reduce the computa-
tional complexity but also reduce the effect of noise
by averaging the data points. For example, if we want
to reduce the data set by 5 times, we average 5 con-
tiguous data points into one data point. In section 4,
we will show that the time for training a user’s profile
can be significantly reduced by re-sampling.
3.3 Support Vector Machines
The classification method used by prior work did not
give very accurate results. Hence, we propose the use
of the SVM technique for better authentication accu-
racy.
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) are state-of-
the-art large margin classifiers, which represent a
class of supervised machine learning algorithms
first introduced by (Vapnik and Vapnik, 1998).
SVMs have recently gained popularity for
human activity recognition on smartphones
Largest
Margin
Figure 2: Illustrating SVM. The purpose of SVM to find out
the largest margin separating two groups of data
(Anguita et al., 2012). In this section, we pro-
vide a brief review of the related theory of
SVMs (Cristianini and Shawe-Taylor, 2000),
(Vapnik and Vapnik, 1998).
After obtaining the features from sensors, we use
SVM as the classification algorithm in the system.
The training data is represented as D = {(xi,yi) ∈
X ×Y : i = 1,2, . . . ,n} for n data-label pairs. For
binary classification, the data space is X = Rd and
the label set is Y = {−1,+1}. The predictor w is
X → Y . The objective function is J(w,D). The
SVM finds a hyperplane in the training inputs to sep-
arate two different data sets such that the margin is
maximized. Figure 2 illustrates the concept of SVM
classification. A margin is the distance from the hy-
perplane to a boundary data point. The boundary
point is called a support vector and there may exist
many support vectors. The most popular method of
training such a linear classifier is by solving a regu-
larized convex optimization problem:
w
∗ = argmin
w∈Rd
λ
2
‖w‖2+
1
n
n
∑
i=1
l (w,xi,yi) (1)
where
l (w,x,y) =max
(
1− ywTx,0
)
(2)
The margin is 2||w|| in SVM. So, Equation 1 min-
imizes the reciprocal of the margin (first part) and
the misclassification loss (second part). The loss
function in SVM is the Hinge loss (Equation 2)
(Gentile and Warmuth, 1998). Sometimes, we need
to map the original data points to a higher dimensional
space by using a kernel function so as to make training
inputs easier to separate. In our classification, we la-
bel the smartphone owner’s data as positive and all the
other users’ data as negative. Then, we exploit such
a model to do authentication. Ideally, only the user
who is the owner of the smartphone is authenticated,
and any other user is not authenticated. In our exper-
iments, we selected LIBSVM (Chang and Lin, 2011)
to implement the SVM. The input of our experiment is
n positive points from the legitimate user and n nega-
tive data points from randomly selected n other users.
The output is the user’s profile for the legitimate user.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the steps in our experiments. The fol-
lowing are some settings in our experiments:
• We use both the PU data set and the GCU data set.
• We use accelerometer, magnetometer and orienta-
tion sensors (can be extended to other sensors).
• We re-sample the data by averaging the original
data, with the sampling rate changing from 1 sec-
ond to 20 minutes.
• Each data is a 9-dimensional vector (three values
for each sensor). We use SVM to train the data
within one day to obtain a user’s profile.
• We label one user’s data as positive and the other
users’ data as negative, and randomly pick equiv-
alent data from both positive and negative sets.
• We experiment with data from one sensor, a pair
of two sensors, and all three sensors to train the
user’s profile. We show that multi-sensor-based
authentication indeed improves the authentication
accuracy.
• In our experiments, we use 10-fold cross valida-
tion, which means that the size of training data
over the size of training data and testing data is
1/10.
4.1 Single-sensor authentication
From Figure 3, we observe the single-sensor-based
system in both the PU data set and the GCU data
set. First, we find that the accuracy increases with
faster sampling rate because we use more detailed
information from each sensor. Second, an interest-
ing finding is that the accelerometer and the magne-
tometer have much better accuracy performance than
the orientation sensor, especially for the GCU data
set. We think this is because they both represent
a user’s longer-term patterns of movement (as mea-
sured by the accelerometer) and his general environ-
ment (as measured by the magnetometer). The orien-
tation sensor represents how the user holds a smart-
phone (Xu et al., 2012), which may be more variable.
Therefore, the accelerometer and magnetometer have
better authentication accuracy. The difference is more
marked in the GCU data set, but the overall relative
accuracy of the three sensors is the same in both data
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Figure 3: Authentication accuracy for single sensor system in (a) the PU data set, and (b) the GCU data set. Higher sampling
rates give better accuracy for each sensor. The accelerometer and magnetometer have better performance than the orientation
sensor. The reason is that both of them record a user’s longer term characteristics, where the accelerometer somehow rep-
resents a user’s walking style and the magnetometer records a user’s general environment. However, the orientation sensor
represents how the user holds a smartphone, which is more variable.
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Figure 4: Authentication accuracy with SVM for a combination of two sensors, for (a) the PU data set, and (b) the GCU data
set. The higher sampling rate gives better accuracy for each sensor.
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Figure 5: Authentication accuracy for single sensors, two sensors and three sensors, for the PU data set and the GCU data set.
The higher sampling rate has better accuracy for each combination of sensors. Two sensors give better accuracy than using a
single sensor, and three sensors further improves the accuracy.
Table 4: The accuracy (%) vs. sampling rate in both PU data set and GCU data set for all combinations of 1, 2 or 3 sensors.
sampling rate (s) 5 10 20 40 60 120 240 360 480 600 900 1200
acc(PU) 90.1 88.3 85.4 85.3 84.5 84.0 80.2 79.2 76.4 69.2 68.8 58.6
mag(PU) 91.0 88.9 86.2 84.6 83.4 74.7 73.3 73.7 68.0 66.4 62.2 60.2
ori(PU) 76.5 74.2 72.2 71.3 69.8 67.1 65.8 64.7 63.9 62.1 60.4 59.0
acc+mag(PU) 92.0 90.0 86.4 86.6 85.9 85.3 81.5 80.3 77.9 70.6 70.5 60.4
acc+ori(PU) 91.8 90.3 87.7 86.2 86.1 83.3 82.0 80.6 77.3 72.2 69.1 67.1
mag+ori(PU) 92.8 91.1 87.7 86.7 84.7 86.5 81.3 74.0 69.1 65.9 63.2 58.3
all(PU) 93.9 92.8 90.1 89.1 87.2 85.2 84.3 82.7 78.7 72.4 70.8 67.2
acc(GCU) 91.0 88.4 87.8 87.9 87.5 82.4 83.1 77.8 78.3 80.2 75.3 73.0
mag(GCU) 92.3 91.2 91.0 85.7 85.2 83.4 79.5 76.7 75.3 72.2 69.8 69.5
ori(GCU) 64.2 63.9 63.8 60.8 60.7 60.6 60.0 60.0 59.1 58.0 57.5 57.3
acc+mag(GCU) 95.5 95.8 94.7 93.7 92.7 91.8 89.2 86.7 84.0 83.1 81.4 79.6
acc+ori(GCU) 96.4 96.6 95.5 94.3 93.1 92.0 90.0 87.1 84.7 83.5 82.7 79.4
mag+ori(GCU) 91.8 90.3 87.7 86.2 84.3 82.2 80.8 79.1 76.2 73.2 71.1 70.1
all(GCU) 97.4 97.1 96.7 95.7 95.3 93.1 90.0 89.1 87.5 85.9 83.1 80.2
sets. The accuracy is below 90% even for fast sam-
pling rates like 10 seconds (see also Table 5).
4.2 Two-sensor authentication
Fig. 4 shows that for all pairwise combinations, ac-
curacy increases with faster sampling rate. The com-
bination of data from two sensors indeed gives bet-
ter authentication accuracy than using a single sen-
sor (see Table 5). The average improvement from one
sensor to two sensors is 7.4% in PU data set (14.6% in
GCU data set) when the sampling rate is 20 seconds.
Another interesting finding is that using a combina-
tion of magnetometer and orientation sensors is worse
than the other two pairs which include an accelerom-
eter. In fact, the combination of magnetometer and
orientation sensors is not necessarily better than using
just the accelerometer (see also Table 4). Therefore,
choosing good sensors is very important. Also, using
higher sampling rate gives better accuracy.
4.3 Three-sensor authentication
Now, we compare the three-sensor-based system with
one and two sensor-based authentication experiments.
From Figure 5 and Table 4, we observe that the three-
sensor results give the best authentication accuracy, as
represented by the top line with triangles in both data
sets, seen more clearly as the highest value in each
column in Table 4. Again, we find that the accuracy
increases with faster sampling rates because we use
more detailed information from each sensor.
4.4 Training Time vs. Sampling Rate
In the rest of the evaluations below, we use the three-
sensor-based system, since it has the best authentica-
tion accuracy.
From Figure 5 and Table 4, when the sampling
rate is higher than 4 minutes (samples every 240 sec-
onds or less), the accuracy in the PU data set is better
than 80%, while that in the GCU data set is better
than 90%. The average improvement from two sen-
sors to three sensors is 3.3% in PU data set (4.4% in
GCU data set) when the sampling rate is 20 seconds.
Furthermore, when the sampling rate is higher than
20 seconds, the accuracy in the PU data set is better
than 90%, while that in the GCU data set is better than
95%.
Figure 6 and table 5 shows that a higher sampling
rate (smaller sampling interval) needs more time to
train a user’s profile. The time exponentially increases
with the increase of the sampling rate. It is a trade-
off between security and convenience. However, the
good news is that when the sampling interval is about
20 seconds, it only needs less than 10 seconds in the
PU data set (and roughly 1 second in the GCU data
set) to train a user’s profile, but the accuracy is higher
than 90% (and 95% in the GCU data set), as seen from
Table 5. It means that a user only needs to spend less
than 10 seconds to train a newmodel to do the implicit
authentication for the whole day in the PU data set and
only 1 second for the GCU data set.
These findings validate the effectiveness of our
method and its feasibility for real-world applications.
Furthermore, our method can be customized for users.
They can change their security level by easily chang-
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Figure 6: (a),(b) represent respectively the time for training a user’s profile by using the SVM algorithm for three-sensors-
based system in the PU data set and the GCU data set. (c),(d) zoom in on (a),(b) to the sampling interval from 1 to 20 seconds
for clarity. We can see that the smaller sampling interval (high sampling rate) needs more time to train a user’s profile.
Therefore, we need to find a trade-off sampling rate to balance performance and complexity.
Table 5: Time for training a user’s profile by using the SVM algorithm for three sensors, for (a) the PU data set and (b) the
GCU data set, respectively. We can see that the smaller sample interval (higher sampling rate) needs more time to train a
user’s profile. Therefore, we need to find a trade-off sampling rate to balance performance and complexity.
sampling interval 1 2 5 10 20 40 60
training time (PU data set) 33502s 1855s 170.72s 39.85s 6.07s 1.19s 0.51s
training time (GCU Data Set) 23101s 485s 62.41s 9.43s 1.02s 0.21s 0.17s
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Figure 7: (a),(b) represent the authentication accuracy and the training time with different training data size for three sensors
in the PU data set and the GCU data set. Blue dashed lines show that the larger data size has better accuracy because we use
more information about the user. Black solid lines show that larger data size usually needs longer training time.
ing the sampling rate of sensors in their smartphones.
4.5 Accuracy and Time vs. Data size
Figure 7 shows another trade-off between security and
convenience. We choose a sampling interval of 10
minutes and a training data size ranging from 1 day to
5 days in the PU data set (and 1 day to 15 days in the
GCU data set). The blue dashed line with triangles
shows that the accuracy increases with the increase
of training data size. The black solid line with cir-
cles shows that the training time increases with the
increase of training data size.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we utilize three sensors: the accelerom-
eter, the orientation sensor and the magnetometer. We
apply the SVM technique as the classification algo-
rithm in the system, to distinguish the smartphone’s
owner versus other users, who may potentially be at-
tackers or thieves. In our experiments, we compare
the authentication results for different sampling rates
and different data sizes, which show a trade-off be-
tween accuracy performance and the computational
complexity. Furthermore, we experiment with data
from a single sensor and from a combination of two
sensors, to compare their results with data from all
three sensors. We find that the authentication accu-
racy for the orientation sensor degradesmore than that
of the other two sensors. Therefore, the data collected
from the orientation sensor is not as important as
that from the accelerometer and magnetometer, which
tend to measure more stable, longer-term characteris-
tics of the user’s coarse-grained movements and his
general physical location, respectively.
Utilizing sensors to do implicit user authentica-
tion is very interesting and promising. Our work
also suggests some other interesting research direc-
tions. First, we can use more detailed sensors’ infor-
mation to further improve the authentication accuracy.
Second, we can try to combine the time information
with frequency information to better obtain a user’s
profile. Many other issues relating to the user’s pri-
vacy remain. It is also interesting to launch an attack
through the sensors’ information because our research
also shows that indeed, sensors can represent a user’s
characteristic behavior and physical environment.
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